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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction to entertain this appeal
under and pursuant to UCA §78-2a-3, and Rule 5, Rules of the
Utah Court of Appeals•

NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an interlocutory appeal by the State of Utah
from an order of the Circuit Court of Garfield County granting
a Motion to Suppress Evidence brought by the Respondent.

STATEMENT OF ISSUE
Respondent was a passenger in his own vehicle when it
was stopped by law enforcement officers.

An immediate search

of the vehicle produced evidence used to support misdemeanor
charges against Respondent.

The sole issue presented by this

appeal is the following:
Was the stop of Respondent lawful under
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to
the United States Constitution, Article
I, Section 14, Constitution of Utah, and
UCA §77-7-15.

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The following constitutional and statutory

- 2-

provisions are determinative of the issue presented for appeal
in this cause:
AMENDMENT IV, CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.
ARTICLE I, SECTION 14, CONSTITUTION OF UTAH
(Unreasonable searches forbidden - Issuance of warrant)
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported
by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the person or thing to be
seized.
UCA §77-7-15
(Authority of peace officer to stop and question
suspect - Grounds)
A peace officer may stop any person in a public place
when he has a reasonable suspicion to believe he has
committed or is in the act of committing or is
attempting to commit a public offense and may demand
his name, address and an explanation of his actions.

NATURE OF THE CASE
By Information dated June 23, 1987, Respondent was
charged in the Circuit Court of Garfield County, State of Utah,
with seven misdemeanor counts.

Respondent was arrested after
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the traffic stop of a vehicle in which he was a passenger.

The

evidence available to the State of Utah to support the
prosecution of Respondent was discovered as a result of the
traffic stop and a subsequent search of the vehicle,

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
Respondent filed motions before trial to suppress all
evidence acquired by the prosecution as a result of the traffic
stop.

An evidentuary hearing was held on the motions on March

17, 1988, after which the parties briefed the relevant issues
for the benefit of the trial Court.

DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT
The trial Court granted Respondent's Motion to
Suppress Evidence based upon the illegality of the traffic
stop, and issued written Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law (See Addendum).

The ruling of the trial Court resulted in

a suppresssion of all evidence which had been acquired by the
prosecution.

The State of Utah then petitioned for permission

to pursue an interlocutory appeal.

That petition was granted

and this appeal followed.

RELEVANT FACTS
During June, 1987, Robert V. Judd, the Sheriff of
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Garfield County, Utah, determined to conduct some roadblocks
(T. 7, 33)• A brief planning meeting was held two or three
days in advance, and although the plans were not reduced to
writing, Sheriff Judd characterized the purpose as "A regular,
drivers license, registration roadblock, spontaneous (T. 18).!f
Four highways were selected for the locations of the
roadblocks, but only two sites along those roadways were
specifically identified, and one of those sites was only
conceived in the mind of Sheriff Judd, that location not being
communicated to the officers who attended the planning meeting
(T. 20). Two of the roadblocks never materialized (T. 21), but
the other two were conducted during the late hours of June 20,
1987 and the early morning hours of June 19, 1987 (T. 33).
Garfield County has no written policy which governs the
establishment and maintenance of roadblocks, and written policy
from another source was not utilized (T. 21). However, Sheriff
Judd testified that he had, the previous year, published a
notice in the paper that spontaneous roadblocks would be
conducted throughout the year, indicating that he drafted the
notice which was published in reliance upon a policy standard
"that came down through the Fish and Game...M which he had
learned about Mby word of mouth..." (T. 21,22).
The first roadblock was maintained on SR-89 for one
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and one-half hours (T. 24). A second roadblock was then
initiated on SR-143, commonly known as the Panguitch Lake Road
a location which is approximately three miles south of
Panguitch, Utah (T. 21). This latter roadblock commenced at
approximately 12:15 a.m., June 19, 1987 (T. 27). No overhead
street lights were in existence at this location, no flares
were utilized by the officers, and no advance warning signs
were placed to advise motorists of the impending nature of the
police presence (T. 27). Four people manned the roadblock,
Sheriff Judd, a deputy sheriff, and two local posse members (T.
27).

Four vehicles were present, two of which were Garfield

County vehicles, the other two being owned by the two local
posse members (T. 28).
The Panguitch Lake Road runs generally south from
Panguitch in a gradual rise to the crest of a hill, and then
descends along a straight course of roadway for approximately
one-quarter mile before turning to the right.

From the crest

of this hill one has a clear vantage point southward to the
location of the roadblock, and a clear view northward to
Panguitch itself (T. 110, 111, 113, 120, 121). Viewing the
roadblock from the crest of the hill, at night, one would see
two red flashing lights, and a set of yellow emergency lights
(T. 28, 188, 119). The appearance of those lights would be

- 6-

consistent with the scene of some traffic accidents (T. 34, 38).
While maintaing the roadblock, the officers saw headlights of a vehicle traveling from north to south, the vehicle
itself and its occupants not being visible (T. 29). This
vehicle turned around on the crest of the hill, a distance
which was approximately one-quarter of a mile north of the roadblock, and then proceeded back to Panguitch (T. 29, 44). Based
on that observation, Sheriff Judd instructed the two posse
members to pursue the vehicle and stop it (T. 29, 30). The
observation and reasoning of Sheriff Judd are revealed by the
following question and answer:
Q. When that vehicle turned around, what
crime did you think had been committed?
A.

I had no idea (T. 29, 30).

The two posse members responded to the instructions11
from Sheriff Judd by entering a four-wheel drive Chevrolet
pickup, which was owned by one of them, and started toward
Panguitch behind the vehicle whose headlights had been observed
when it turned around at the crest of the hill (T. 46, 47).
The two posse members followed the vehicle three miles
into Panguitch (T. 55), but did not observe any traffic
violations (T. 56). The testimony of one of those officers,
recited from his written report, stated that:
The driving pattern was good all the way

- 7-

that we followed him and we did not see
anything being thrown out (T. 54).
The posse members radioed ahead to Panguitch City
police officers and a discussion ensued as to whether or not
there existed probable cause to stop the vehicle (T. 69, 70,
74, 75, 91). The Panguitch City officers in fact stopped the
vehicle, in response to the radio discussion with the posse
members (T. 69,70).

The Chevrolet pickup being used by the

posse members had a red light installed in its grill, but the
officers disagreed as to whether or not it was activated (T.
73).
After making the stop the officers learned that the
vehicle was a truck which was owned by Respondent (T. 96), and
the identities of the occupants were then ascertained (T. 97),
Respondent being one of them (T. 93).
The officers then searched the truck, finding
marijuana, alcohol and protected wildlife (T. 94).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Law enforcement officers manning a roadblock during
nighttime hours saw the lights of a vehicle approach them to
within one-quarter of a mile, turn around, and then proceed in
the opposite direction.

No crime was observed.

The supervising

officer at the roadblock stated that he "no idea" of the nature
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of any crime being committed.

Nevertheless, he instructed

officers to follow the vehicle and stop it.

Those officers did

follow the vehicle, observing no traffic violations, summoned
other officers by radio, and made a stop of the vehicle in
question.

Respondent was an occupant.

The vehicle was

immediately searched, with evidence being found to support
charges then brought against Respondent.
did not exist to justify the stop.

Reasonable suspicion

No officer was able to

articulate any crime or public offense being committed or
attempted.

The stop violated UCA §77-7-15, Article I, Section

14, Constitution of Utah, and the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution.

The stop itself being

unconstitutional, all evidence subsequently seized was
inadmissible, and the order of the trial Court suppressing that
evidence should be affirmed.

DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENT
A brief stop of a citizen by a law enforcement officer,
even though the detention is brief and the purpose merely
investigatory, to be lawful, requires that the officer possess
"specific, articulable facts, together with rational inferences
from those facts, that reasonably warrant suspicion that . . .!! a
crime has occurred or is being committed.

This standard was
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announced in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873
(1975).

The "reasonable suspicion11 test of Brignoni-Ponce is

codified in UCA §77-7-15.
53.

State v. Sierra, 82 Utah Adv. Rep.

This statutory provision allows a person to be stopped by

a peace officer in a public place when the officer has ffa
reasonable suspicion to believe" that a crime has been
committed by that person, or a crime is in process or being
attempted.

The facts known to the officer which give rise to

reasonable suspicion must be objective, and not mere hunch,
guess work, or other non-articulable suspicions.

State v.

Carpena, Utah, 714 P.2d 674 (1986).
The "reasonable suspicion standard is grounded in the
Fourth Amendment, Constitution of the United States, and
Article I, Section 14, Constitution of Utah.

State v.

Trujillo, Utah, 739 P.2d 85; State v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544,
(1980).

Brief, public, and investigatory stops, which fall

short of a traditional arrest, are governed by these statutory
and constitutional provisions.
(1968).

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1

No distinction in such an investigatory stop is made

between that of a pedestrian and the stop of occupants of a
vehicle.

Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 649 (1979); State v.

Cole, Utah, 674 P.2d 119 (1983); Sierra, supra.
When a motion to suppress evidence is brought before a

- 10 -

trial court, contending that a stop has been made in derogation
of the statutory and constitutional provisions cited above, and
with testimony being offered regarding that issue, the trial
court is in the best position to assess the credibility of the
witnesses, and findings of fact which are rendered to either
grant or deny the motion should not be disturbed unless found
to be clearly erroneous.

State v. Ashe, Utah, 745 P.2d 1255

(1987); State v. Mendoza, Utah 748 P.2d 181 (1987).
In the case at bar, Respondent was a passenger in his
own vehicle.

That vehicle was being operated lawfully on a

public highway.

Respondent's vehicle, within one-quarter mile

of a roadblock, turned around, and proceeded in the opposite
direction.

Officers observed that driving pattern, and without

more, stopped the vehicle.

No crime was observed.

No officer

who observed the events could articulate any element of
criminal behavior.

To the contrary, officers testified that

they followed Respondent's vehicle for a distance of some three
miles and observed no traffic offenses.

Prior to the stop, the

officers did not know the identity of the occupants of the
vehicle, nor did they have knowledge of any illegal contraband
contained therein.

The supervising officer in question

testified that "he had no idea" of the nature of any crime
being attempted or committed.

Simply stated, there was not one
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objective fact offered to support the stop of Respondent.
The observance of a vehicle by law enforcement
officers when the vehicle is (a) moving slowly, (b) at 3:00
a.m., (c) through a neighborhood which had recently suffered a
series of burglaries, where (d) the car had out-of-state
license plates, did not afford sufficient facts to meet the
reasonable suspicion standard so as to justify an investigatory
stop.

Carpena, supra.

In Carpena, the vehicle was followed

for three blocks, stopped, and a search of its contents produced
a loaded pistol from the passenger compartment and thirty pounds
of marijuana from the trunk.

The Supreme Court of Utah held

that the observations by the officers were not based upon
objective facts so as to support reasonable suspicion.
In Sierra, supra, this Court had occasion to consider
the lawfulness of a brief investigatory stop of a vehicle.
Sierra was the driver of a vehicle traveling on Interstate 15
near Leeds, Utah.

Officers passed Sierra, observed the driver

glance away quickly, and bow his head.

A computer check of the

license plate of the Sierra vehicle found that it was not
reported as stolen.

Nevertheless, viewing the conduct of the

driver as suspicious, the officers exceeded the speed limit in
an effort to overtake and stop the vehicle.

Before the stop,

the officers observed the Sierra vehicle traveling in the
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left lane of the highway at a speed of 56 miles per hour and
pass two other cars traveling in the right lane.

After the

stop, the vehicle was impounded, searched, and controlled
substances were found.

Although paying tribute to the

intuition of the officers, this Court viewed their observations
as being insufficient to meet the objective standard of the
reasonable suspicion test.

The prosecution in Sierra also

argued that the traffic offense (driving in the left lane)
justified the stop.

The Court analyzed that claim and

concluded that it was a pre-text stop.

In other words, the

stop was viewed as having for its purpose the desire to
investigate a hunch of criminal behavior, and not that of
issuing a traffic citation.
The Utah Supreme Court analyzed the lawfulness of a
vehicle stop in the context of seven factors which were offered
by the prosecution to justify a stop in Mendoza, supra.

In

Mendoza, officers observed a vehicle traveling on Interstate 15
during early morning hours.

They observed the occupants to be

of Latin origin, and pursued the vehicle at high speed.

The

subject vehicle remained in the left lane in the face of rapid
acceleration behind them of the officers, and belatedly turned
into the right lane with movements characterized as "jerky11 by
the officers.

The officers also viewed the occupants as
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behaving nervously and avoiding eye contact.
vehicle bore California license plates.

The subject

Following a stop of

the vehicle, marijuana was discovered and the occupants
arrested.

The Court explored each of the facts relied upon to

justify the stop and found them to be unavailing.

The Court

then held the stop to be in contravention of Fourth Amendment
rights.

Since the stop itself was unconstitutional, the Court

held that all evidence subsequently seized was inadmissable.
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1979).
In the instant case, the conduct of Respondent was
entirely consistent with law abiding behavior.

Even the usual

factors relied upon to justify stops are not present in this
case.

We do not have out-of-state plates.

occupants of Latin descent.
,f

nervousn behavior.

offense.

We do not have

We do not have observations of

We have no commission of a traffic

The officer who directed the stop of Respondent could

not offer any rationale to justify the stop.
Appellant argues the application of Sections 77-7-2,
41-6-13, 41-6-13.5, and 41-6-67.

However, Sections 77-7-2 and

41-6-67 were not urged as statutory authority by Appellant in
the Circuit Court, and cannot now be considered on appeal.

In

any event, they would have no application to the facts of this
case.

UCA §77-7-2 authorizes an arrest when reasonable cause

exists to believe that a public offense has been committed.
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That is a more exacting standard than the reasonable suspicion
test which controls a resolution of the issue in this case.
UCA §41-6-67 prohibits a U-turn when traffic is not visible for
a distance of five hundred feet.

In the case at bar, the U-turn

in question occurred on the very crest of a hill when visibility
existed for one-quarter of a mile to the south, and a greater
distance to the north.
Regarding Sections 41-6-13 and 41-6-13.5, the trial
court held that they had no application to the facts because
the signals therein discussed were not in fact given by the
officers.

UCA §41-6-13 prohibits the willful non-compliance

with the lawful order or direction of a peace officer, and UCA
§41-6-13.5 proscribes the failure to stop a vehicle when
signaled to do so by an officer.

No such signals were given to

the vehicle in this case before Sheriff Judd directed that it
be pursued and stopped.

Nevertheless, Appellant argues that

the very existence of the roadblock, with the lights which were
visible, constituted a signal or direction for the vehicle of
Respondent to stop.
results.

That argument would produce ludicrous

The vehicle of Respondent was one-quarter mile away

from the roadblock when it turned around.

The lights emanating

from the roadblock were consistent with some traffic accidents.
There is nothing to indicate that the occupants of Respondents
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vehicle even knew that a roadblock existed.

Assuming arguendo

that the driver of Respondent's vehicle recognized the lights
as being those of a roadblock, there is nothing to compel a
continuation of the journey to that location.

Otherwise, any

motorist, at any location, when seeing the lights of a
roadblock, however distant, would be required to travel to the
location of the roadblock and submit to the seizure and
interrogation which would follow.

Would a rancher, seeing a

roadblock some miles distant, be required to proceed to that
location, and interrupt his intended journey along a side road
to his ranch.

Would a motorist, driving for pleasure, upon

seeing a roadblock some miles ahead, be required to proceed to
that location when his or her intended journey had its
destination elsewhere.

The trial court answered these

questions by correctly finding that Mthere is no State statute
requiring motorists, upon observing a roadblock, to continue
thereto and stop."

(Finding 15, Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law -- see Addendum)

CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT
Reasonable suspicion to stop Respondent did not exist.
The stop was impermissible under UCA §77-7-15, and invaded the
rights of Respondent which are afforded to him by Article I,
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Section 14, Constitution of Utah, and the Fourth Amendment to
the United States Constitution,

All evidence learned or seized

by law enforcement officers as a result of the stop is fffruit
of the poisonous tree" and was properly suppressed.

The ruling

of the trial Court should be affirmed.
DATED this 30th day of January, 1989.
LABRUM, TAYLOR § BLACKWELL

MARCUS TAYLOR j \
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I herewith and hereby certify that four copies of the
foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT were placed in the United States
mail at Richfield, Utah, with first-class postage thereon fully
prepaid, this 30th day of January, 1989, addressed as follows:
Patrick B. Nolan
Garfield County Attorney
P.O. Box 388
Panguitch, Utah 84759

MARCUS TAYLOR/ 1
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STATE VS. TALBOT
CASE 87-CR-196
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
PAGE -2-

4.

On June 19, 1987 at about 10:00 P.M. a road block

was established by the Garfield County Sheriff on U. S. Highway 89
at Milepost 130, a location about three miles south and east of
Panguitch, Utah.
5.
vehicles.

The road block was comprised of five people and four

The five people were the Sheriff, a Deputy and three

members of the Sheriff's Posse.
flashlights.

All were in uniform and carrying

The four vehicles were two police vehicles and two

private vehicles.

Each vehicle was equipped with standard, four-way

emergency flashers, which were in operation.
a law enforcement symbol on the doors.

Each vehicle displayed

Each police vehicle was

equipped with a red spotlight mounted on the driver's door post
which was illuminated and flashing.
6.

The police vehicles were parked on the asphalt

portion of the highway but outside the traffic lanes so as to face
oncoming traffic.

The private vehicles were parked on the shoulder

of the highway.
7.

There were no flares, warning signs, nor any traffic

control devices used.
8.

All traffic was stopped at the road block where the

officers checked for drivers licenses, vehicle registration and any
safety equipment violations.

STATE VS. TALBOT
CASE 87-CR-196
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
PAGE - 3 -
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STATE VS. TALBOT
CASE 87-CR-196
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
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(a) 41-6-26 since, by its own terms, it applies to
traffic signals or signs which were not used in this
case;
(b) Section 41-6-13, since Defendant never reached
the road block.
(c) Section 41-6-13.5, since there is no evidence
that any signal was directed toward this Defendant from
the road block.
15.

There is no state statute requiring

motorists, upon observing a road block, to continue thereto
and stop.
The foregoing Findings of Fact are sufficient to
to support the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The road block was proper since it was

planned in advance and since every car was stopped.
2.
suppressed.

The evidence seized from Defendant must be
It was seized in violation of (a) Article I,

Section 14, Utah Constsitution, (b) U. S. Constitution,
Amendments 4 and 14, and (c) Section 77-7-15 U.C.A.

Dated this ^LX-

day of

ntftt-

, 19_22_-

Davi^L. Mower, Circuit Judge
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